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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20000941-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
JACK V.WILKINSON,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession or use of
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(1998).1 This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support
defendant's conviction for possession or use of methamphetamine.
Standard of Review. This Court affords great deference to the jury verdict. State v.
Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, the appellate court reviews the

defendant was also convicted of two class B misdemeanor offenses—possession
or use of marijuana, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998), and
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(a)
(1998). See R. 122-23. However, he does not challenge those convictions on appeal.
Aplt. Brf. at 7.
1

evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury
verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 1993). The Court will not reverse a jury

(

conviction for insufficiency of the evidence unless "the evidence is so lacking and
insubstantial that reasonable [minds] could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a

<

reasonable doubt." State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
I

The interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules is not relevant to a
determination of this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

.'

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant was charged by information with possession or use of methamphetamine,
a third degree felony, possession or use of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, and unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-2. More than a year after
defendant was formally charged, he was bound over for trial on all three counts. R. 64-65.
Defendant, who failed to appear at trial, was tried in absentia and convicted of all three
counts as charged. R. 90, 122-24; R. 260: 89-90. Thereafter, the court issued a bench
warrant for defendant's arrest. R. 125-26.
After defendant's arrest on the bench warrant, he filed several post-trial motions. R.
136-47. All of his motions were denied except his motion to remove counsel. SeeR. 148153. After the appointment of conflict counsel, defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment
on grounds unrelated to this appeal. See R. 156-64. That motion was denied. R. 168-72.
2
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Thereafter, the court ordered a competency evaluation on the petition of defendant. 173-75,
184-89. Following the evaluation, the court found defendant competent to proceed. R. 193.
Defendant then moved to recuse the judge, but that motion too was denied. R. 196-99,20507; see also R. 232-34.
Defendant filed another motion to arrest judgment, alleging that the evidence was
insufficient as a matter of law. R. 212-17. The court denied the motion. R. 227.2 The trial
court subsequently sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of not more than five
years for possession or use of methamphetamine and to concurrent jail terms of 180 days for
each misdemeanor conviction. R. 241-42. Defendant timely appealed. R. 244-45.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

On August 1,1998, defendant spent the day with his friend Stephen Bullock. See R.
260:40,42,44. At least part of the day was spent at Bullock's parents' home in Orem where
defendant helped his friend repair his truck. See R. 260: 40. The two also used drugs
together that day, smoking marijuana and injecting methamphetamine. R. 260: 42, 44, 58.
At some point that day, the two left the Orem residence in Bullock's truck. R. 260:
39-40. Near midnight, the friends drove from Pleasant Grove towards American Fork. See
R. 260: 39-40, 55. Driving behind the two in his patrol car was Deputy Owen Shiverdecker
of the Utah County Sheriffs Department. R. 260: 55. When Deputy Shiverdecker attempted
to pass the truck, Bullock swerved into the other lane forcing Deputy Shiverdecker to slow

2

The trial court's Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment is reproduced
in Addendum A.
3

down behind him. R. 260: 55. Once again behind the truck, Deputy Shiverdecker observed
Bullock again cross the traffic lines. SeeR. 260: 55.
Deputy Shiverdecker activated his overhead lights to stop the truck. R. 260: 40, 55.
Before the deputy approached the vehicle, defendant placed the assorted drugs and
paraphernalia lying in the truck in a paper sack and hid them under the bench seat. R. 260:
41,44. Deputy Shiverdecker walked up to the driver's door and spoke with Bullock. R. 260:
55. In the meantime, Deputy James Bingham, who had driven to the scene as backup,
walked up to the passenger door of the truck where defendant was seated and stood there.
R. 260: 48, 57.
While speaking with Bullock, Deputy Shiverdecker noticed that Bullock appeared
exceptionally relaxed. See R. 260: 55-56. He did not respond promptly to the deputy's
questions, his speech was somewhat slurred, and he was not otherwise very alert. R. 260:
55-56. Deputy Shiverdecker also noticed that defendant was slumped over, leaning against
the side of the car, with his head bobbing forward. R. 260: 56. Defendant appeared to be in
worse condition than Bullock. R. 260: 56. These characteristics were symptomatic of not
only alcohol or heroin use, but also marijuana use or the latter stages of methamphetamine
use. See R. 260: 53-54, 58, 67-68.3

3

Deputy Shiverdecker testified that methamphetamine initially elevates the level of
activity in users for 12 to 24 hours, making them "very excited, very full of energy,
uncontrollable energy even." R. 260: 54. He farther testified, however, that when user's
are coming off a high on methamphetamine, "they generally do what's called 'crash.'
They sleep, if they don't have access to more drugs, sleep a day, two days, three days."
R. 260: 54.
4

When Deputy Shiverdecker shined his flashlight into the truck to determine if there
was any evidence of alcohol consumption, he observed a syringe lying on the passenger side
of the floorboard. R. 260: 56-57. Suspecting that Bullock was under the influence, Deputy
Shiverdecker requested that Bullock submit to a series of field sobriety tests, which he failed.
R. 260: 55. Bullock also admitted to having used drugs that day. R. 260: 40-41. Deputy
Shiverdecker handcuffed Bullock and placed him under arrest. R. 260: 57.
After arresting Bullock, Deputy Shiverdecker walked to the passenger side of the car
and asked defendant to exit the truck. R. 260: 48,57. Before doing so, defendant kicked the
syringe and a metal spoon out onto the ground. R. 260: 57, 67. Deputy Shiverdecker again
asked defendant to exit the truck. R. 260: 57. As he did so, defendant reached down, picked
up the syringe, and tossed it back into the truck in an apparent attempt to hide it. R. 260: 5758, 63, 68.
Deputy Shiverdecker, who knew defendant, observed that defendant "didn't seem
himself—his speech was "very, very slurred" and he "seemed very out of it." R. 260: 58.
He also observed a recent track mark on defendant's left arm. R. 260: 72-74. Suspecting
that defendant was high on drugs, the officers handcuffed him. R. 260: 48-49, 58. When
defendant asked why he was being handcuffed, Deputy Shiverdecker explained that he
believed him to be "too high to be out of handcuffs" R. 260: 58. Upon being so advised,
defendant "said he hadn't shot up since that morning." R. 260: 58.
Deputy Shiverdecker then searched defendant's person, finding identification not
belonging to him and a capped syringe in his back pants pocket. R. 260: 58-59,63,70. After
5
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Deputy Shiverdecker's search of defendant, Deputy Bingham escorted him to his patrol car.
R. 260: 48-49, 58-59. Although Deputy Bingham did not smell any particular odor coming
from defendant's person, he noticed that defendant's speech was "very slurred, his eyes were
red, [and] his pupils were dilated." R. 260:49-50. After Deputy Bingham gave the Miranda

<

warning, defendant said that "he didn't know anything about anything." R. 260: 49, 71. He
claimed he did not know where the drugs came from and asserted that they probably
i

belonged to Bullock. R. 260:49. Defendant thereafter invoked his right to remain silent and
said nothing more. R. 260: 49.
A search of Bullock's truck by Deputy Shiverdecker revealed a small baggy of
methamphetamine on the center of the seat where defendant had been sitting. R. 260: 59,64,
69. Deputy Shiverdecker also found underneath defendant's seat, near the center hump, a

{

white paper sack containing several capped syringes, a small baggy of marijuana, and a
syringe which was a quarter full of a yellow substance appearing to be methamphetamine.
R. 260: 59-62, 65, 69-71.4 Deputy Shiverdecker also recovered the spoon defendant had
kicked onto the ground, which had a white cotton ball stuck to it with methamphetamine
residue on that. R. 260: 60, 63-64, 66.5

'

4

The liquid substance in the syringe was not tested due to its increased health
hazard to lab technicians. R. 260: 71-72.
5

Methamphetamine is prepared for injection by placing the powder in a spoon or
similar object and heating it with a butane torch or lighter until it liquefies. R. 260: 5960. Users then extract the liquid with a syringe after placing a small cotton ball in the
liquid to remove some of the impurities. R. 260: 60.
6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence introduced at trial is sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for
possession or use of methamphetamine. In assessing the strength of the case, the Court must
view the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable
to the verdict. When the driver was stopped, defendant, who was a passenger in the truck,
was sitting on a baggy of methamphetamine. Before the deputy could approach, defendant
tried to hide the drugs and paraphernalia lying in the truck by placing them in a paper sack
and concealing them underneath his seat. Defendant admitted to injecting methamphetamine
earlier that day. He had a syringe in his pants pocket. A spoon used for preparing
methamphetamine was lying on the floor at his feet. All these circumstances and others
demonstrated that defendant had possession of the methamphetamine, having both the power
and intent to exercise control over the drug. The evidence also was sufficient to establish
that defendant used methamphetamine that day. His admission that he used the drug that
morning was corroborated by the recent track mark on his arm, the paraphernalia on his
person and under his control, and his physical condition.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OR USE OF METHAMPHETAMINE
On appeal, defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction
for possession or use of methamphetamine. Aplt. Brf. at 7-12. The jury's verdict is afforded
great deference. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). In reviewing a jury

7
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verdict on an insufficiency claim, the Court reviews the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1212 (Utah 1993); accord State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 18, 10 P.3d 346. The
conviction will not be reversed unless "the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that
reasonable [minds] could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt."
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980); accord Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1212 (holding that
a conviction will not be reversed unless the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime"); State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^ 12,985 P.2d 911
(holding that a conviction will be overturned only if "it is apparent that there is not sufficient
competent evidence as to each element of the crime charged for the fact-finder to find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime"). A review of the record
here reveals that the evidence supported defendant's conviction.
A.

ESTABLISHING CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION.

The Utah Controlled Substances Act makes it unlawful to "knowingly and
intentionally [ ] possess or use a controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(1998). "To prove that a defendant was in knowing and intentional possession of a
controlled substance, the prosecution need only establish that the produced contraband was
found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the accused had the ability and the
intent to exercise dominion and control over it." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah
1987). "Actual physical possession presupposes knowing and intentional possession." State
8

v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985). However, "[u]nlawfiil possession does not
necessarily mean that the substance be found on the person of the accused or that he have
sole and exclusive possession thereof." State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981);
accord Fox, 709 P.2d at 318-19. "A conviction may also be based on constructive
possession." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319.
To establish constructive possession, it is not enough to show that a defendant knew
where drugs were located or even that he had access to those drugs. Id. at 320. The State
must "prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an
inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control
over the drug." Id. at 319; accord Layman, 1999 UT 79, at % 15 (citing Fox); Hansen, 732
P.2d at 132 (holding that "[tjhere must be some additional nexus between the accused and
the contraband").

In other words, "evidence supporting the theory of 'constructive

possession' must raise a reasonable inference that the defendant was engaged in a criminal
enterprise and not simply a bystander." Fox, 709 P.2d at 320.
Whether a sufficient nexus exists to establish constructive possession "is a highly factsensitive determination." Layman, 1999 UT 79, atf 14. Appellate courts have considered
various factors in determining whether a defendant has constructive possession of
contraband. In Fox, the supreme court addressed whether a homeowner and his brother had
constructive possession of nearly 3,000 mature marijuana plants grown at the home. Fox,
709 P.2d 319-20. The State's high court considered as relevant factors: (1) "[o]wnership
and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs are found;"(2) "incriminating
9
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statements made by the accused;" (3) "incriminating behavior of the accused;" (4) "presence
of drugs in a specific area over which the accused had control, such as a closet or drawer
containing the accused's personal effects;" and (5) "presence of drug paraphernalia among
the accused's personal effects or in a place over which the accused has special control." Id.
(internal citations omitted).
In State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991), the Court of Appeals addressed
whether the driver of a car had constructive possession of drugs found in a package in the
backseat where a passenger had been sitting. In addition to incriminating statements and
behavior, relevant factors identified by the Court in Salas included (1) the sale or use of
drugs, (2) the "proximity of defendant to [the] location of drugs," (3) "drugs in plain view,"
and (4) "drugs on defendant's person." Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388 (footnote omitted).
In Layman, the Supreme Court cautioned against "mechanically relying on a list of
factors, such as those set out in Fox and Salas, when applying" Fox's sufficient nexus test.
Layman, 1999 UT 79, at ^f 15. The Court issued this caution because the factors identified
in Fox and Salas "are not universally pertinent factors," but were instead "particularly
relevant to the specific factual context in which those cases arose." Id. at ^f 14. Nevertheless,
the Layman court held that "[t]here is nothing wrong with a succeeding court considering
factors that were considered relevant by an appellate court analyzing a factually-similar
context." Id. at J 15. Thus, the factors identified in Fox and Salas "might be of help in
guiding a finder of fact [in a similar case] in determining whether there was constructive
possession." Id. at ^f 14. Courts may consider those factors as "relevant considerations in
10

making the underlying determination," while remaining mindful that the list is not
exhaustive. Id. at ^ 15.
B.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A JURY FINDING THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED
METHAMPHETAMINE, HAVING BOTH THE POWER AND THE INTENT TO EXERCISE
CONTROL OVER IT.

As is the case here, the Fox and Salas courts addressed constructive possession under
circumstances where the defendant occupied with others a place where contraband was
found. Accordingly, the factors considered in Fox and Salas are also relevant here in
determining whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant had constructive
possession of the methamphetamine. See id. at ^f 15 (observing that courts may consider
factors considered in other decisions where factually similar).6 Those factors and others
support the conviction.
Proximity of the Drugs. The evidence was uncontradicted that defendant was present
in the truck where the methamphetamine was discovered. R. 260: 39-40, 59, 64, 69.
Although he was not the owner or the driver of the truck, he had apparently been sitting on
drugs, sitting on the very seat where the methamphetamine was found. R. 260: 59, 64, 69;
6

Defendant argues that this case "is really Layman in reverse." Aplt. Brf. at 10.
However, other than Layman's reiteration of the Fox "sufficient nexus" test, it offers little
assistance here. As noted by the Supreme Court, Layman was "not a house or car case."
Layman, 1999 UT 79, at f 16. Instead, Layman addressed "whether [the defendant] had
sufficient control over another person to prove constructive possession of something that
person had in her physical possession." Id. (emphasis added). The Layman court
reversed the defendant's conviction because "there was little evidence to prove that [the
defendant] had such control over [a woman passenger] that one could reasonably infer
beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally possessed the drugs and
paraphernalia in her [waist] pouch." Id. Whether defendant had any control over another
person is not an issue here.
11
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see Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388 (holding that the "proximity of defendant to location of drugs"
is a relevant factor). He thus had better access to the spot where the methamphetamine was

(

found than did Bullock, who was driving. See Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389 (weighing as a factor
against a finding of possession by the driver the fact that a passenger had better access to the
cocaine in the vehicle than did the driver). Clearly, "[t]he mere presence of the defendant
in an automobile in which illicit drugs are found does not, without more, constitute sufficient
1

proof of his possession of such drugs." Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388 (internal quotes omitted).
Nevertheless, it is an "important factor," Fox, 709 P.2d at 319, and there was much more
evidence establishing constructive possession.
Incriminating Behavior.

<

Defendant's behavior was highly incriminating and

supported an inference that he intentionally exercised dominion and control over the
methamphetamine. Before Deputy Shiverdecker walked up to the two men, defendant tried
to hide the drugs and paraphernalia lying in the truck by gathering them into a paper sack and
i

concealing them under the seat. R. 260: 41,44. However, his attempt to put everything in
the paper sack was not entirely successful. A spoon used to prepare methamphetamine for
injection remained on the floor, as did a syringe. R. 260: 56-57, 60, 63-64, 66-67. Before
-.. exiting the truck, defendant kicked the spoon and syringe out of the truck onto the ground.
R. 260: 57,67-68. While these actions could have been accidental, they certainly support an
inference that defendant was trying to conceal them from the deputies. This Court must
assume that the jury drew that inference supporting the verdict. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1213
(holding that "in reviewing a jury verdict [the Court] assume[s] that the jury believed the
12
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evidence supporting the verdict"); Goddard, 871 P.2d at 544 (holding that an appellate court
is obligated to uphold any "fair inferences" drawn by the jury as long as they are not
speculative). Certainly, it was no accident that as defendant exited the truck, he picked up
the syringe and put it back in the truck in an apparent attempt to hide it from the officers. See
R. 260: 57-58, 63, 68.
The baggy of methamphetamine also did not make it into the paper sack, but rested
on the center of the seat where defendant had been sitting. R. 260: 59, 64, 69. Given
defendant's attempts to hide the other drugs and paraphernalia, the jury could reasonably
infer that defendant had also tried to conceal the methamphetamine by sitting on it.
Defendant thus not only demonstrated power and dominion over the methamphetamine, but
also exhibited a consciousness of guilt.
Presence of Paraphernalia. In addition to finding the spoon that defendant had
kicked outside the truck, the deputies found the partially loaded syringe that defendant had
hidden in the paper sack. R. 260: 41,44, 59-62, 65, 69-71. The yellow liquid in the syringe
was consistent with methamphetamine. R. 260: 59-60,65. Moreover, Deputy Shiverdecker
found a capped syringe in defendant's pants pocket. R. 260: 58-59, 63, 70. Thus, the tools
for preparing methamphetamine were present in the truck and on defendant's person: the
baggy of methamphetamine lying on defendant's seat, the spoon and cotton ball for heating
and purification which defendant kicked out of the truck, and the syringes, including the one
found in defendant's own pocket. See R. 260: 59-60. The jury could thus reasonably infer

13
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that defendant not only had the power to exercise dominion and control over the
methamphetamine, but also the intent to exercise control over it. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 319.
Incriminating Statements. That defendant had the power and intent to exercise
control over the methamphetamine was further buttressed by his admission to having injected
drugs that very morning. When Deputy Shiverdecker explained that he was handcuffing
defendant because he was "too high to be out of handcuffs," defendant protested, declaring
that he had not "shot up since that morning." R. 260: 58. This admission was consistent with
Bullock's testimony that the two had used methamphetamine and marijuana that day. R. 260:
40-42, 44, 58. Whereas the two had used drugs together that day, the jury reasonably
inferred that they were sharing the drugs—despite any claim that the marijuana belonged to
defendant and the methamphetamine belonged to Bullock. See R. 260:41. Moreover, while
Bullock surmised that the methamphetamine was probably his because it was in his truck,
he also testified that he was not sure he even knew it was there. R. 260: 41, 43. He thus
testified, "But I'm not exactly - where they found it in there, I'm not exactly sure it was mine
or someone else had left it there or whatever." R. 260: 43.
Indicia of Impairment or Use. Another relevant factor, not addressed in Fox or
Salas, was defendant's physical condition. Deputy Shiverdecker testified that defendant
"didn't seem himself." R. 260: 58. He testified that he first observed defendant slumped
over against the side of the truck with his head bobbing forward. R. 260: 56. His speech was
"very, very slurred." R. 260: 49, 58. His eyes were red and his pupils dilated. R. 260: 49.
As described by Deputy Shiverdecker, defendant "seemed very out of it" and in worse
14

condition than Bullock. R. 260: 56, 58. Bullock in fact confirmed Deputy Shiverdecker's
observations, testifying that defendant "was really out of it because he was tired." R. 260:
44. The recent "track mark" on defendant's left arm further supported the inference
defendant had recently been using methamphetamine. See R. 260: 72-74. Defendant's
condition was thus consistent with "coming down off methamphetamine. See R. 260: 42,
54. The jury could therefore reasonably infer that defendant had used methamphetamine that
day and that he intended to exercise control over the methamphetamine he had been sitting
on.

In sum, the evidence introduced at trial established that "a sufficient nexus" existed
between defendant and the methamphetamine found in the truck "to permit an inference that
[defendant] had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the
drug." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319; accord Layman, 1999 UT 79, at Tf 15. The evidence supports
the inference that defendant was not only aware of the drugs, but was actually "engaged in
a criminal enterprise and not simply a bystander." Fox, 709 P.2d at 320; see also Salas, 820
P.2d at 1388 (holding that "suspicious or incriminating behavior" is a relevant factor).
C.

THE EVIDENCE ALSO SUPPORTED A JURY FINDING THAT DEFENDANT " U S E D "
METHAMPHETAMINE.

The evidence also supported a finding that defendant used methamphetamine that day.
The statute not only prohibits the possession of methamphetamine, but also the "use" of
methamphetamine. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Defendant suggests that the
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evidence was insufficient to show that he used methamphetamine because neither deputy
observed him doing so. See Aplt. Brf. at 8 (stating, "Nor did law enforcement personnel
observe [defendant] actually use methamphetamine").

Direct observation by law

enforcement officials is not a prerequisite to a sustainable conviction. Cf. State v. Starks, 627
P.2d 88,92 (Utah 1981) (observing that "[t]he prosecutor's burden,... whether the evidence
be direct or circumstantial, or a combination thereof, is to prove all elements of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt").
When Deputy Shiverdecker explained to defendant that he was "too high to be out of
handcuffs," defendant admitted to having "shot up" that morning. See R. 260: 58 (declaring
that he had not "shot up since that morning").

Evidence corroborating his use of

methamphetamine that day was extensive. The deputy observed a recent "track mark" on
defendant's left arm. R. 260: 72-74. Bullock testified that he and defendant were "coming
down off methamphetamine use from earlier that day and defendant's physical
characteristics—slumped over position, bobbing head, and slurred speech—were indeed
consistent with the later stages of methamphetamine use. See R. 260: 42,49-50, 53-54, 56,
58,67-68.
Moreover, methamphetamine was found on the center of the seat where defendant had
been sitting. R. 260: 59, 64, 69. The deputy recovered the spoon with a cotton ball stuck to
it containing methamphetamine residue which defendant had kicked out of the truck. R. 260:
60, 63-64, 66-67.

A syringe partially filled with a yellow liquid consistent with

methamphetamine was found in the paper sack underneath defendant's seat. R. 260:41,44,
16

59-62, 65, 69-71. And significantly, another syringe was found in defendant's own pants
pocket. R. 260: 58-59, 63, 70.
The foregoing evidence, when considered as a whole, was more than sufficient to
establish that defendant had "used" methamphetamine that day.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted this fry day of August, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

^EJFREY S. GRAY
~^
^-A'SSISTANT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENE;
GENERAL
Attorneys for Appellee
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Margaret P. Lindsay
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin
43 East 200 North P.O. Box "L"
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ADDENDA

Addendum A
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Fourth j:j-i:i.r. C,i3!rict Cou-\
oi Uiah Coumy. Siats of Utah
CARMA B. SMITH. Clerk

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT C J / I I M ^
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

DeDutv

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO ARREST JUDGEMENT
CASE NO. 981405492

vs.

DATE: May 25,2000
JACK VIRGIL WILKINSON,

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
Defendant.

DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder
LAW CLERK: Gunda Jarvis

The Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment and the facts of the case. Based on the
facts, a jury could easily have found actual, physical possession of the drugs, as well as constructive possession.
Numerous facts existed by which the jury could have determined that there was a sufficient nexus between the
Defendant and the drugs to find him guilty, as set form in the jury instructions and precedent case State v. Fox. 709
P.2d 316 (Utah 1985). These facts include but are not limited to the following: Defendant was found with a syringe
at his feet in the vehicle; upon exiting the vehicle Defendant kicked the syringe and a spoon that tested positive for
methamphetamine to the ground; Defendant attempted to recover the kicked syringe; upon arrest of the Defendant
a used syringe was found in his pocket, which syringe Defendant admitted was his; andfinally,the arresting officer
found track marks on the Defendant's arms, in regard to which the Defendant told the officer that he had shot up
earlier that day.
This Court holds mat the facts presented to the jury were sufficient to show a strong nexus between the
Defendant and the drugs he was convicted of possessing, and the Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment is hereby
DENIED.

DATED this 1-4

day of May, 2000.
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Sherry Ragan, Deputy Utah County Attorney
James Clark, Counsel for Defendant
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